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Abstract
The so-called golden years of capitalism took place under the auspices of a broad politi-
cal consensus that labour should be protected and benefit from economic growth. This 
compromise eroded in the 1980s and 1990s as shown by the rise in income inequalities 
and in unemployment. At the turn of the century, it became clear that the sustainability of 
the global economy was at stake. It is useful in this perspective to assess, as this chapter 
attempts to do, both the conditions in which the old compromise of the welfare states 
collapsed and how then the discussions on the sustainable development goals can be 
implemented and play the role of a new capital labour compromise at world level.
Keywords: income inequalities, capital labour compromise, financialization,  
sustainable development goals
1. Rising inequalities as a major trait of all contemporary societies
Developed economies have observed at the turn of the 1990s a rise in income inequalities. 
It seemed at first sight to be logically linked with an increasing internationalization of these 
economies. The competition of low-paid workers has indeed put a strong pressure on the 
wage of blue workers in these developed economies. Moreover this trend did not seem to 
decline as it should have, after a time of adjustment. Meanwhile the internationalization of 
the developing economies, which has effectively helped to reduce extreme poverty, has also 
been in most cases accompanied with growing income inequalities. By the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the rise in inequality within countries had become a common phenom-
enon all around the globe. The demise of the communist alternative at the turn of the 1990s in 
both Russia (with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990) and in China with the economic reform 
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put in place by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s (first in villages then in major towns) can be con-
sidered as a factor contributing to this rise, but some three decades after observing that this 
trend went on so ubiquitously remains astonishing. The benefits brought by the development 
of market mechanisms all around the world have been distributed in ways that increased the 
income inequalities. The generality of this trend is puzzling, even if levels of inequalities still 
differ among countries. Figure 1 shows how income inequalities have developed all across 
the board of developed economies from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s. This figure shows the 
generality of this trend,1 even before the global financial crisis of 2008, which of course stands 
as a major factor fuelling the trend in the last decade. Indeed, as we shall see, a liberalized 
finance plays a major role in this trend, but one has to take into account that other factors also 
contribute to this phenomenon. A long-term view of the evolution of income inequality in 
the USA is very telling in that respect. Much before the liberalization of the banking system 
around the 1980s, with the dismantling of the Glass Steagall act which had been designed in 
the 1930s to limit speculative activities (see Figure 2), one can observe that inequality in the 
pre-tax distribution of income has practically ceased to decrease by the early 1950s. Only the 
post tax distribution of income shows some continuous decline in inequality. This phasing 
underlines that a decade or so after the big drop in inequality that immediately occurred with 
the entry of the USA in World War II the mechanisms governing employment and wages in 
the US economy did not anymore lead to a reduction in income inequality. Only some follow-
up in the tax policy contributed to further reduce (lightly) income inequality. As soon as this 
1With some rare exceptions over the period like France or Belgium on which we shall come back.
Figure 1. Gini coefficients of income inequality, mid 1980s and late 2000s.
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tax policy started to reverse with the diffusion of the neoliberal economic ideology among 
the policy makers, income inequality (both pre-tax and post tax) resumes a growth that has 
been lasting till now (see Figure 2). The acknowledgment of such lasting trend in income 
inequality has had an extraordinary echo in public opinions in the western world. The topic is 
permanently addressed in media as well as in academic conferences. The success of Piketty’s 
2013 book [2] is very telling in that respect.2 Still very little has been done in that respect to 
reverse the trend in raising income taxes. If anything, these taxes have been reduced in some 
countries to align with other competing economies. Everything seems to show that the very 
process of globalization fuels a downwards pressure on the levels of income taxation while 
pressing on low wages and boosting some high wages more closely associated to the dynam-
ics of profits.
Kuznets, Nobel Prize winner in economics in 1971, predicted that trade liberalization would 
lead first to an increase in income inequalities which would reverse after a while. Though the 
long trend in the contemporary rise in income inequality does not seem to curb down.3 Is it 
due to the scale of the present wave of liberalization of trade or to some other specific fac-
tor? How can one explain such rigidity? How can such unequal situation be endured by the 
populations? How is this politically sustainable in countries which have and are still praising 
2With more than 2.5 million copies sold of this 700-page book worldwide by fall 2016 (see https://theconversation.com/
is-pikettys-capital-in-the-twenty-first-century-really-the-most-unread-bestseller-67713); this success stresses a societal 
fact, a mix of curiosity and anxiety, worth to be studied in itself.
3All the more puzzling that the Nobel nomination of 1971 mentioned that this attribution was “for his empirically 
founded interpretation of economic growth which has led to new and deepened insight into the economic and social 
structure and process of development”, all of which comforts the idea we want to explore that times have changed after 
the 1970s.
Figure 2. Income inequality over a century in the USA. Source: Piketty et al. [1].
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equality and democracy? The reason has to be looked for in the political history of the specific 
relations between wage earners and capitalists in all the populations under view.
We shall restrict our investigation to the history of politics in the western economies which 
have for long been proud of their democratic systems which seemed to go all along with 
some normative views regarding the spread of incomes and more especially the spread of 
wages. Such views are social conventions which play a great role in the fabric of societies but 
which clearly can evolve along time depending on the social and economic contexts. Though 
such changes in conventions by nature are long processes and one may find difficult to see 
if a convention is slowly definitively petering out or just transitorily affected. Lessons can be 
drawn from history in that respect. And regarding the past of the democracies of the western 
world, a major reference remains the conventions on which, in the aftermath of World War II, 
the reconstruction of the capitalist regimes took place.
Section 2 will thus review rapidly the conventions that took place in the aftermath of World 
War II. On this basis, Section 3 will revisit the present situations in order to assess whether a 
new convention could emerge and of which kind.
2. Lessons of the post-World War II labour-capital compromises
The 1929 economic crisis, altogether with the ensuing disasters of World War II, led large part of 
the western populations to think that capitalism could not go on as it stood in the pre-war period. 
All the more so, communism could represent a desirable alternative for growing shares of the 
population if only to get rid of the spectrum of unemployment. Such stand was made clear in a 
famous paper of a polish follower of Keynes, Michael Kalecki, in 1943, [3] stating that capitalism 
will have to ensure full employment, or it would have to be scrapped. Such strong positions can 
be found in the various programs of reforms that were discussed, more or less in every western 
country, at the end of World War II. All these proposal, though termed differently and more or 
less explicitly and comprehensively regarding their view of full employment,4 shared a common 
call for a drastic revision of capitalism towards what Shonfield [4] will call a “modern capital-
ism”. A view of the universal nature of this call at the time can be given by the spirit of a confer-
ence which took place in Philadelphia in 1944 (cf Supiot [5]), organized by the UN to give a fresh 
post-war restarting to the International Labor Office (ILO). The articles included in the 
Philadelphia declaration (presented in Insert 1) show how committing was the calls to reform 
capitalism. By and large these changes occurred in most western countries, and these “modern 
capitalisms” did effectively succeed within less than a decade to reach their own objectives of full 
employment and to develop their own welfare state. This diversity will be a lasting figure of this 
modern capitalism as it will be stressed at the turn of the twenty-first century by Hall and Soskice 
[6] and Amable and Petit [7]. The imperative of the reconstruction of the huge war destructions 
in Europe did give a boost to the rapid economic growth experience in most western countries in 
guiding the aftermath of World War II. A set of international institutions, negotiated at Bretton 
4A major reference in these calls was Beveridge in the UK and the program of the Conseil National de la Résistance 
(CNR) for France. A similar call in the USA materialized with the vote of an employment act.
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Wood (USA) in 1944,5 also served as a framework, guiding the development of the western coun-
tries, slowly opening up to trade, facilitated by a fixed exchange rates system based on a dollar, 
freely convertible into gold. Significantly helping has also been at the time the Marshall plan 
launched by the USA to ensure a quick resuming of the European economies. All these special 
circumstances did accompany the turn towards these “modern capitalisms”, also qualified as 
welfare states, to refer to the role of the state in the organization of the welfare systems that were 
then developed. Still one should not be misled and think that these times were those of harmonic 
peaceful relations between labour and capital. The development of these welfare states has been 
marked by continuous struggles (mainly strikes) to increase rights, transfers and wages. All these 
improvements were parts of the current political debates. The issues were more on the timing of 
these measures, considering their actual feasibility, than on their principles which had been 
somehow acted with the big employment conventions of the World War II aftermath. It took also 
some times to the workers themselves to realize that major changes had occurred in the working 
of capitalism. Only around the 1960s did they realize to what extent their ways of life, social 
protection and aspirations had changed, with access to the American way of life, with their 
equipment goods, of which owning a car stood as the more symbolic, becoming the new normal. 
Somehow the widespread protest of the youth, at the end of the 1960s, was linked with the con-
sciousness that the emergence of relatively affluent, more consumerist societies6 was bound to 
change the old patterns of social relations. Strangely enough, another face of the coin showed up 
rather rapidly at the turn of the 1970s: the impact on the environment of this development, using 
intensively natural resources. A report stressing the limits of growth was widely diffused (cf. [8]) 
but seemed at the time to have a limited influence on policies, much concerned by the slowdown 
in economic growth which occurred then. In effect, in this more consumer-oriented world, 
fuelled by increasing trade flows, the trust in a gold exchange standard, based on the dollar, 
suddenly collapsed, largely due to the costs of the Vietnam war for the USA. A system of flexible 
exchange rates soon replaced the gold standard fixed exchange rate system. The transition rap-
idly fuelled waves of interrelated inflations of domestic prices, mainly launched by a high rise in 
5Where Keynes himself played a great role
6Indeed the protests of the youth around 1968 had many origins, but looking at some of the references like Marcuse, the 
trend towards a more materialistic, more individualistic world was one of them.
The final declaration, approved unanimously by the participants, reaffirmed four principles (now in the constitution 
of the ILO):
Principle 1: Labour is not a commodity which encapsulates workers as persons are at the heart of labour legislation and 
should be protected.
Principle 2: Freedom of expression and association are essential human rights.
Principle 3: War against poverty (required as poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere) and 
want (with unrelenting vigor within each nation and by continuous and concerted international effort).
Principle 4: Tripartism (in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those 
of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision, with a view to the promotion of the 
common welfare).
Insert 1. On the principles put forward at the Philadelphia conference organized by the ILO in 1944.
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oil prices, set up by the OPEC, a coalition of oil producers, eager to protect their incomes in times 
highly uncertain. This oil price shock in turn led to a sharp slowdown in the economic growth 
rates of the western countries and to unprecedented rises in unemployment, thought in the first 
place to be transitory. Policy makers at the time focused on the reduction of inflation as the main 
way to adjust to the change to a flexible exchange rate regime. In this fight against price inflation, 
the liberalization of the economies became the main motto and wage rigidities the main factor in 
accusation. The flexibilization of labour markets surged as a major policy issue. At this point the 
contradiction with the big labour-capital compromise became obvious. Full employment had lost 
its priority, and the sharing of productivity gains was not any more the major determinant of 
wage increases. Though of the full employment convention had not entirely disappeared. Policies 
against inflation were still presented as a transitory mean to adjust to the competitiveness among 
countries introduced by a flexible exchange rate system. At the turn of the 1980s, as the situation 
was not improving a decade after the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, 
another kind of argument was advanced. Free market economics would bring to the workers a 
consumer surplus, the reduction in prices of consumer goods helping to rise their purchasing 
power. The argument was weak as what the workers could win in such bargain was largely 
overtaken by the losses induced by increasing unemployment and a stagnation of wages follow-
ing the flexibilization of labour markets adjusting to the rising competition of low-wage coun-
tries. Still this argument has been advanced by such “populist” leaders as Reagan and Thatcher, 
a way for them to sell the Friedmanian turn in the public management of the western economies. 
Within a decade or so, this turn to free market economics made it clear: a vast majority of wage 
earners were the losers, and the theme of the consumer surplus was not heard of anymore, if only 
in the handbooks of the apologists of this free market economics, attached to the formal beauty of 
the highly unrealistic neoclassical model of general equilibrium. This “silent revolution” (to echo 
Gill [9]) which put an end to the references to the full employment convention of the post-war 
period was somehow completed in the early 1990s with the demise of the communist alternative, 
as  symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall. Meanwhile the consumerist movements that emerged 
in the 1970s and early 1980s petered out in the 1990s (as shown by the rise and fall of Ralf Nader 
in the political scene of the USA7); no alternative convention emerged from the political debates. 
The main benefiter of this liberalization of the economies has finally been the financial sector. It 
took advantage of the liberalization of trade and capital movements to develop its operations at 
a global level. The rising role of finance, which much contributed to the hollowing out of the full 
employment convention, is still far to have been unanimously accepted. For some it is a key factor 
for the adaptation of the economy; for others it fuels all kinds of speculations, leading to detri-
mental financial crises, tax evasion and wealth concentration. Strangely enough finance even 
succeeded to find ways to develop financial services for an impoverished working class, diffus-
ing new specific loans for housing or acquiring equipment goods (see [10, 11]). The sub-prime 
loans were one of these tools and will remain in history as the uncontrolled financial instrument 
at the origin of the 2008 global financial crisis. The securitization of uncertain loans (e.g. poten-
tially non-performing loans) created lots of financial havocs. No wonder that so many politicians 
have issued bashing statements on finance and all the more surprising that so few actions have 
7A fall that went so far that Ralf Nader at the presidential election of 2000 said to prefer Bush for a shock therapy to Al 
Gore, that he considered as an anaesthetist.
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been taken to domesticate it.8 A good reason may be that the 2008 GFC (global financial crisis) has 
shown the limited power of countries to coordinate their actions vis à vis a world of finance, 
largely interconnected and including some major financial powers, giving a new dimension to 
the “too big to fail” argument. It does not follow that all citizens had a dual view of finance. The 
need to domesticate finance has become in the process a clear dividing lines between pros and 
antis, between those who would like to go back to a boaring finance9 (to quote Bidhe [12]) and 
those who see In a liberalized innovative finance an efficient tool of development. Still those in 
favor of a domestication of finance remained in all developed countries a minority. On the other 
side, an apathy, if not a sympathy, towards the role of finance has been developing a long time 
with what can be considered as a passive corruption of large parts of the elites. The financial 
sector, widely speaking, for example, insurance and business services, has strongly contributed 
to an incredible widening of the wage scales in most activities. Pretending to reward individual 
productivities (where in most cases they cannot be distinguished from collective ones10), they 
paved the way for a general expansion of the wage scales. While major entrepreneurs of the 1950s 
and 1960s supported a norm of 1–10 between wages in a given enterprise; this ratio went up to 
some 400 in some industries at the turn of the twenty-first century. It became so much out of the 
current social norms that Obama could in the years 2000s regret the existence of such “obscene 
wages” (see [13]). No wonder then that, with such devastation of the full employment conven-
tions of the post-war era, researchers like Piketty could observe a steady rise in income inequali-
ties (see Section 1). Even more alarming this trend, legitimizing wide scales of wages, was not a 
transitory phenomenon, linked with a generation that had the opportunity to experience the turn 
towards a new free market economics; it also tended to become a new normal for the new elites 
entering the flexibilized labour markets. The financial sector did attract in the 2000s a fair share of 
the elite of the major schools of the western world (see Colander [14] for the USA). Such largely 
extended wage hierarchies, at a time when conversely the wage labour status was itself divided 
into many kinds of petty jobs, had thus became more or less a common trait in the developed 
economies. Does that mean that the erosion of the full employment conventions, a silent revolu-
tion indeed, considering the lack or weakness of protests on the political scenes, had been accom-
plished by the time of the 2008 GFC? Indeed a good share of the new social elites seemed both 
largely internationalized and considering as a new sustainable growth regime this world, where 
most of the norms regarding distribution (with wide ranging wage scales) and production (with 
international games of mergers and acquisitions) have been set by the financial sector. Indeed 
authors coined the term financialization to characterize such new regime.11 The whole question is 
then whether such regime is transitory or sustainable. To answer such question, one needs to pay 
more attention to the factors of change and to the various challenges met by our societies.
8A typical instance of such duality is given by the President Hollande who first claimed, while campaigning, that 
“finance” was his enemy and who finally did not dare to do anything, for fear he could only harm French Banks in a 
world of globalized finance, well out of reach of national policies.
9Until its abolition by Bill Clinton in 1999, the Glass Steagall Act voted in 1933 restricted branching and forced banks to 
deal either with securities or with commercial banking but not with both.
10If only in very specific cases where the financial values of individuals are given by a specific market, as it is the case for 
actors in sports or in the showbiz or can be tied to the results of their operations as with the traders in finance.
11For an overview of the socialization of this process of financialization, see the special issue of the Revue de la 
Regulation https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/12337 and especially the interview of a specialist of the issue 
Greta Kripner [15].
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3. Towards an era of new compromises or the entry in times of post 
democracy?
Indeed the political debates around the financialization of most of the developed economies 
lead one to consider it as a rather transitional regime as it looks politically unsustainable.12 The 
success of Piketty’s book, denouncing the long and widespread rise of inequalities within 
countries around the world is showing a wide questioning, which in a democracy could 
become the basis of a political rejection of such financialized regime. But this display of an 
anxious questioning in a broad social class of educated people does not seem sufficient for 
such political turn around.13 The fiscal policy measures recommended in the book, such as a 
tax on wealth that would apply across the globe (to take into account fiscal evasion), did not 
rally masses of citizens and had little echo in political debates. They may have looked too far 
out of reach to mobilize a large political movement. It does not follow that these denunciations 
had no impact. They contribute to some consciousness of the drawbacks of the present devel-
opment regimes, weakening the positions of those who try to legitimize them and strengthen-
ing all those who are in favor of radical changes. In that sense it is an active determinant in the 
class struggle that is developing between labour and capital in the moving context created by 
the hollowing out of the full employment conventions. Interestingly enough there has been 
other examples of similar denunciations which helped to forge new “compromises” if we can 
apply through times this notion (which seems rather fitted for the “modern capitalism” men-
tioned above). We could refer to the hygienists who denounced the poor health state of the 
working class in the early age of industrialization, endangering the very reproduction of the 
capitalist regime and thus helped to raise the social issue. But this was a rough and primitive 
phase of capitalism. Some decades after, while a more mature capitalism, under the pressure 
of rising social conflicts (see Marx Communism Manifesto 1868), had taken on board that it 
had to address a social question (as shown in Germany with the creation by Bismarck in the 
1880s of a first kind of welfare state), a book on income inequality had a wide audience. Progress 
and poverty (1879) of the American essayist Henry George was sold for over 3 million copies 
[16]. The book focused on the rent that land owners enjoy from the development of the econ-
omy that the industry of labour and capital produces. George called for a significant taxation 
of this rent which could help to enhance development in financing public utilities and mea-
sures of welfare (including a basic income scheme). The book had a lot of influence not only in 
the USA but also in the UK. It was inspiring in launching the progressive era that would lead 
more than half a century later to the “modern capitalism” referred to above. It thus, for 
instance, was one of the references in the creation of the Fabian Society in the UK. This current 
of thought was clearly reformist, proning a soft transition (Fabius, the Roman model, was 
famous for his art of delaying to wait for the good timing) and not at all hinting at gathering a 
12While its economic sustainability seems constantly under the threat of rising risks of major financial crisis, not too 
speak of its highly limited capacity to act on the environmental issues, as it appears more and more clearly with the 
failures of free market mechanisms to cope with environmental issues. See also Boyer [17].
13Very few people fear like Alain Minc, French essayist and business man close to Macron, that inequalities are too high 
and that we risk some insurrection.
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momentum that would have helped a full change of labour-capital compromise.14 At the same 
time, the writings of Karl Marx were much more challenging of the existing political order, as 
they focused on rising the political consciousness of those under the discriminatory pressures 
of the capitalists for their living. To have any significant leverage effect, the denunciation of 
inequalities has to come with a clear exposition of who win, who loose and in which manner. 
The readership of the two books on inequality did feature who are the winners, but how does 
it happen and how could it be stopped remain unclear. In such context, to call for taxation, be 
they specific, remains vague. The political mobilization, required for such taxations to effec-
tively occur, has to be done on a broader base, explaining what will be done with these taxes 
and how it would change the labour-capital relations.15 This political incompleteness of the 
mere denunciation of a rising income inequality is shown by the facts that the major political 
movements contesting the present state of the compromise between labour and capital are the 
so-called populist movements which in the first place claim their opposition to the internation-
alization of the economies, which they saw as the main cause of unemployment and hardship. 
Most of these “populist” movements have become protectionist and accuse most of the elites 
to form a new international social class. Still they are not calling upfront for taxation policies 
that would reduce income inequality within countries.16 Indeed the electorate of these populist 
movements cannot be characterized by specifically low levels of income.17 As surprising as it 
may be, the denunciation of rising income inequality is not rallying the electorate of populist 
movements, nothing like the rallying effect of the migration issue. The fact that little attention 
is paid to income inequality invites to consider these populist movements as a phase in a 
deeper political transformation. Mouffe and Errejon [18] thus speak of a “populist moment”, 
stressing the transitional nature of the emergence of these movements. It seems all the more 
relevant that their silence on the rise in income inequalities could well lead to major splits 
within these movements.18 Could such split fuel some political recomposition? Indeed the 
opponents to these populist movements represent a large variety of stands, regarding the pres-
ent trends of internationalization. As a matter of fact, those who accept or support more or less 
actively this internationalization remain most often divided in at least two political parties, 
reproducing an old right and left division. Some authors identify the most active supporters, 
as technocrats (see [19]); others denounce a supranational elite, although these groups do not 
constitute effective political parties. These outspoken supporters express their beliefs in the 
benefits that the international order, governed by the set of existing international bodies, has 
delivered and will continue to do so in the near future. Still the opinions in this broad loose 
14Incidentally Henry Georges was much in favor of free trade, praising its advantages in terms of consumer surplus, 
an influence which may be why Reagan and Thatcher used the same argument to support the turn in the early 1980s 
towards economic liberalism.
15Olivier Blanchard, ex chief economist of the IMF, does suggest in an interview in Le Monde (July 10, 2018) that it is 
necessary to extend the redistribution, in terms of negative income tax and increases in public spending on education in 
order to reverse the rising trend in income inequality, adding that governments are acting too slowly on this objective 
as they are on climate change.
16At the turn of the 1970s, some populist movements like the Front National in France were clearly in favor of economic 
neoliberalism and only progressively turned to call for protectionist policies, still being relatively silent on income 
inequality among nationals.
17As shown with the 2016 US presidential election where the lower income class voted more for Clinton than for Trump.
18This transitional aspect is also stressed in Coates [20] who refers to Gramsci notion of “morbid symptoms” between 
two social settlements.
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group vary largely depending on the type of market mechanisms that should in their view 
prevail in the dynamics of further internationalization. Some strongly believe that market 
forces, led by price competitiveness, should be the driving force, and their favorite policies are 
geared towards the reduction of tariffs. Others pay more attention to the fact that norms of 
products and production modes should evolve in order to meet the various challenges encoun-
tered in the course of the expansion of internationalization. Trying to avoid worsening of 
labour conditions (such as uses of child labour or slaves) has been among the first calls for 
normative actions. Monitoring the freedom of investment and the mobility of capital in order 
to limit unfair competition linked with too big disparities in financial power has been another 
topic of concern, not to speak of fiscal competition among trade partners. Intellectual property 
rights are also a matter of continuous harsh discussions, be it on their amount or on their dura-
tion. Clearly for this second group of supporters, the regulation of markets by means of norms 
of production and products is an ongoing concern conditioning, a proper functioning of mar-
kets that would effectively increase the well-being of the populations. In this context common 
to most developed economies where a broad group has more or less actively supported the 
recent trends of internationalization, two new factors are bound to exacerbate their division 
and may lead to a split. The first factor is that tariffs on trade have been extensively reduced 
and it is much more disputable to pretend that further reduction in tariffs could lead to an 
increased internationalization that could benefit all trade partners in terms of growth and 
employment (see Reza [21] who points at various official reports showing the opposite). It 
follows that the reduction of “invisible” barriers to trade (e.g. non-tariff) tends to become a 
central issue for any further internationalization, a perspective which is highly dividing the 
group which had been so far open to internationalization. The second factor, which is also 
fuelling this gap, is the widespread and rising acknowledgment of major threats on the sus-
tainability of our patterns of development which is calling urgently for new norms on products 
and modes of production. The sharp inflection of the monitoring of the internationalization 
that this acknowledgment implies is a rising source of conflicts. The supports of international-
ization will for a sizeable share of the group become more and more radically conditioned by 
strict norms on products and modes of production, while the “dedicated free marketers”, only 
concerned with price competitiveness, will consider as abusive the burst of non-tariff barriers 
to trade. Could such a turn of affairs lead to a political restructuring ending with a new social 
settlement? Indeed, if the rising income inequality leads to a split of the populist movements, 
while their opponents split on strict monitoring of markets, there could be some room for a 
reconstruction of a renewed left. Much depends on the new solidarities that could emerge in 
this process. If the search for more sustainable development paths leads to support short pro-
duction-consumption circuits, circular and collaborative economy, it may help low-income 
people in reducing their current expenditures. Still such restructuring has little chance to occur 
right away at national levels, where charismatic populist leaders see to it that no political alter-
native emerges. Chances are more open for such political restructuring to occur at local levels. 
In that respect it has been widely stressed that even if the rationale for ecological policies is 
strong, pro-environmental actions are really mobilizing people when experienced at local lev-
els, while their purpose remains too abstract at national or international level (an argument 
rightly put forward by Latour [22]). In that perspective environmental policies could, through 
a bottom-up process, taking advantages of a multitude of local experiences, effectively initiate 
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some political recombination. It would have to be relayed at national levels by policies accom-
modating the policy requirements expressed in the diverse local experiences. But for this 
political recombination to be itself sustainable, the whole process needs also to be relayed at 
the international level. Only then would we end with a sustainable compromise around envi-
ronmental issues. This last transformation at the international level is not in itself a minor step. 
Part of the rise of the populist movements seems to have come from the exteriority of the 
supranational level in diverse regional union. As stressed in Aglietta, leron [23], the resent-
ment of populations vis a vis the supranational institutions came from the lack of political 
involvement of the people in the running of these supranational institutions, all of which adds 
to the complexity and hazard conditioning the emergence of a lasting new compromise. The 
worry comes also from the fact that such multilevel arrangement is bound to take time when 
precisely most of the environmental issues imperatively require rapid actions to be taken. The 
huge challenge of the international process of negotiations monitored by the United Nations is 
precisely to speed up the processes of local transformations worldwide in order to prevent a 
fatal degradation of the environment. If a new democratic and efficient global governance of 
the environment does not take place rapidly enough, there is a big risk of conflicts between 
countries that will have turned into aggressive authoritarian states under the influence of 
unreconstructed populist governments.19
4. To conclude on the narrow road that could lead to a new 
compromise
Under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Conventions on climate change 
(UNFCCC), a series of Conventions of the Parties COP have been meeting every year since 
the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 to discuss how countries could cooperate to meet an environ-
mental challenge increasingly acknowledged as threatening human survival on earth. The 
Paris Convention of the Parties (COP21 in December 2015) succeeded to rally all countries, 
developed and developing, in committing themselves (by means of Nationally Determined 
Contributions) in this battle. This was soon followed by the expression of 17 objectives, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), listing the various types of actions to be undertaken 
to win this battle. These objectives took seriously the three dimensions of the global objective 
of sustainability, combining environmental sustainability with social and economic sustain-
ability. This declension implies that the battle can be fought at various levels, be it the nation, 
the region, the city or the neighborhood. It thus opens to the development of new social links 
of cooperation, solidarity and responsibility that may significantly contribute to the recon-
struction of the populist movements that we alluded to in the above section. A major plague 
of the last decade of growth and internationalization has been the development of misery 
(as distinct of poverty20) even if economic growth has helped to reduce poverty, especially in 
developing countries. Misery is often linked with an urbanization where the poor have lost 
19A trend exposed in Crouch [24] assertion of our entry in a post democratic era.
20A distinction clearly expressed by Joseph Wresinsky, initiator in the 1960s of International Movement ATD Fourth 
World “Poverty, material deprivation, oppression inflicted by those who have power are hard to bear. What is truly 
insufferable however is being despised and continuously reminded that one is an inferior and utterly useless being”.
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their communitarian links.21 Incidentally, the last two decades have also been the ones where 
the share of menial precarious jobs in developed economies has significantly increased. A 
major characteristic of this precariousness, beyond the relative poverty of these workers, is 
the lack of secure work-based identity (as stressed in Standing [25] book), and in that sense, it 
also impacted formal jobs in developing countries. In this context, the battle at various levels 
to promote the SDGs becomes a potential major instrument to counter this trend and restore 
the citizenship status which is lacking so crudely. This reconstruction of settlement status 
would significantly reduce the attractiveness of the populist movements and force the recon-
struction of the populist movements called for. Making such assessment, we are confronted 
with the discussion reported in Milanovic book [26], opposing legal inequality and income 
inequality. Milanovic, following Therborn and Piketty, underlines the danger of a single-
minded focus on existential inequality, which may seem to be the case when we insist on bas-
ing identities on a secure work. As a matter of fact, one has to stress that comprehensive and 
effective promotions of the SDGs are also bound to develop a fair size of non-market activi-
ties, promoting the (re)creations of Commons, the emergence of cooperatives and practices of 
collaborative activities. The insistence on the local levels of action goes in that direction; the 
construction of a new compromise that should gain some momentum is a largely bottom-up 
process. The size of the expansion of non-market activities is bound to produce a real break 
towards what could be called to the least a “Modern capitalism number 2”. Nevertheless to 
reach such momentum, the process will need to rely rapidly enough on some scheme of basic 
income.22 There is a wide range of such possible schemes if one includes to a basic monetary 
transfer some free access to goods and services as well as opportunities of financing various 
personal projects with local complementary currencies. In such perspective, the emergence of 
a new compromise between labour and capital at a truly international level would certainly 
take a big diversity of forms, even more than it did with the post-World War II compromise, 
with a logic driven by a continuous adaptation to environmental changes. It should also 
rapidly lead to a political recombination, splitting the old populist trends for ex-followers 
to take part in some of the new non-market activities, becoming more and more part of the 
modern ways of life. New alliances will be passed with those parts of elite classes favoring 
internationalization, providing that markets are strictly regulated to preserve the environ-
ment and the human beings. A growing fraction of the new generations, more and more 
concerned to take part in activities contributing one way or another to the SDGs, will support 
such alliances. Old dedicated free marketers and unreconstructed reactionary populists may 
maintain some oppositions, bound to decrease as market mechanisms will be more and more 
unable to cope with the degradation of the environment. But again the new compromise has 
to gain rapidly enough momentum to contribute to the expected adaptation to our changing 
environment with the risks if it fails to leave the room to authoritarian regimes and endless 
open conflicts.
21A distinction already stressed by the French writer Charles Peguy in 1902 and reused by Paul Goodman commenting 
the war on poverty launched by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Let us notice passim that 2008 is also the year where 
urban population became a majority in the world population.
22In that sense the approach of Guy Standing is very consistent, being one of initiators of BIEN, Basic Income, European 
Network, while developing his work on the extension of the precariat.
Classes - From National to Global Class Formation28
Author details
Pascal Petit
Address all correspondence to: pascal.petit@univ-paris13.fr
Centre d’Economie de Paris Nord (CEPN), University of Paris, France
References
[1] Piketty T, Saez E. Zucman G. Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates 
for the United States. Quaterly Journal of Economics. 2018;133(2):553-609. https://eml.
berkeley.edu/~saez/PSZ2016Slides.pdf
[2] Piketty T. Le capital au XXIème siécle. Paris: Le Seuil; 2013 (2014) English edition Harvard 
University Press
[3] Kalecki M. Political Aspects of Full Employment Political Quarterly. 1943. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1943.tb01016.x
[4] Shonfield A. Modern Capitalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; 1968
[5] Supiot A. L’esprit de Philadelphie. La justice sociale face au marché total. Paris: Seuil; 
2010
[6] Hall P, Soskice D. The Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundation of Compa-
rative Advantage. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press; 2001
[7] Amable B, Petit P. The diversity of social systems of innovation and production during 
the 1990s. 2001. Working paper CEPREMAP N°2001-15. http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/
couv_orange/co0115.pdf
[8] Meadows D, Meadows DL, Randers J, Behrens W. The Limits to Growth; A Report for 
the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (PDF). New York: Universe 
Books; 1972
[9] Gill S. Transnational class formations, European crisis and the silent revolution. Critical 
Sociology. 2016;43(4-5):635-651. https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920516656920
[10] Rémi Bazillier R, Héricourt J, Ligonnière S. Les inégalités, un moteur du crédit aux 
ménages. La Lettre du CEPII, N°379, Août. 2017. http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/fr/publica-
tions/lettre/abstract.asp?NoDoc=10418
[11] Ragan R. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. 
Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press; 2010
[12] Bidhe A. In Praise of Primitive Finance: The Economists’ Voice. Berlin, Boston: Walter de 
Gruyter GmbH & Co.; 2011;6(3):1553-3832. https://doi.org/10.2202/1553-3832.1534
Rising Inequalities and Reconstruction of Labour Capital Compromises
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.82499
29
[13] Steiner P. Les rémunérations obscènes. Le scandale des hauts revenus en France. La 
Découverte; 2011;12:150
[14] Colander D. The economics major is not a pipeline to finance. Eastern Economic Journal, 
Palgrave Macmillan; Eastern Economic Association. 2016;42(3):483-487
[15] Kripner G. The financialisation of the American economy. Socio-Economic Review. 
2005;3:173-208
[16] George H. Progress and Poverty. Unabridged Text (1912). 1879. http://www.econlib.org/
library/YPDBooks/George/grgPP.html
[17] Boyer R. Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A preliminary 
analysis. Economy and Society. 2000;29(1)
[18] Mouffe C, Errejon I. Construire un peuple. Paris, France: Éditions du Cerf; 2015
[19] Bruno V. The Production of Fear. European Democracies in the Age of Populisms and 
Technocracies. Social Europe; 2018
[20] Coates D. Flawaed Capitalism: The anglo-American Condition and its Resolution.
Agenda Books. April 2018. 328 p
[21] Reza W. Globalisation, inequality and the future of democracy. euromemo.eu. Discussion 
Paper No. 01/2018. http://www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/01_2018_raza_globali-
sation_inequality_and_the_future_of_democracy.pdf
[22] Latour B. Où atterrir? Comment s’orienter en politique. Paris: La Découverte; 2017
[23] Aglietta M, Leron N. La Double Démocratie: Une Europe politique pour la croissance. 
Paris: Seuil; 2017
[24] Crouch C. Post Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press; 2004. 144 p
[25] Standing G. The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsburry Academic; 
2011
[26] Milanovic B. Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Harvard 
MA, USA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2016
Classes - From National to Global Class Formation30
